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With the application of digital technology to safety-critical infrastructures, cyber-attacks have emerged
as one of the new dangerous threats. In safety-critical infrastructures such as a nuclear power plant
(NPP), a cyber-attack could have serious consequences by initiating dangerous events or rendering
important safety systems unavailable. Since a cyber-attack is conducted intentionally, numerous possible
cases should be considered for developing a cyber security system, such as the attack paths, methods,
and potential target systems. Therefore, prior to developing a risk-informed cyber security strategy, the
importance of cyber-attacks and signiﬁcant critical digital assets (CDAs) should be analyzed. In this work,
an importance analysis method for cyber-attacks on an NPP was proposed using the probabilistic safety
assessment (PSA) method. To develop an importance analysis framework for cyber-attacks, possible
cyber-attacks were identiﬁed with failure modes, and a PSA model for cyber-attacks was developed. For
case studies, the quantitative evaluations of cyber-attack scenarios were performed using the proposed
method. By using quantitative importance of cyber-attacks and identifying signiﬁcant CDAs that must be
defended against cyber-attacks, it is possible to develop an efﬁcient and reliable defense strategy against
cyber-attacks on NPPs.
© 2018 Korean Nuclear Society, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Over the recent decades, analog instrumentation and control
(I&C) systems in a nuclear power plant (NPP) have been replaced
with digital I&C systems. Digital technologies provide various
beneﬁts such as the possibility of software utilization, high-speed
data processing capability, and fault detection or fault tolerance
techniques. However, new threats that did not exist in analog
systems have been introduced such as a cyber-attack. There have
been reports of cyber-attacks on the I&C systems of infrastructures
that adopted supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems, industrial control systems (ICS), and distributed control
systems (DCS) [1]. The annual report from the U.S. industrial control
systems cyber emergency response team (ICS-CERT) states that the
number of cyber-attacks on energy systems increases year after
year [2]. In 2011, global energy and oil ﬁrms were cyber-attacked by
a combination of variable routes [3]. Even in NPPs which are
designed to decidedly ensure physical and cyber security, thereby Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an
, S.J. Lee, Probabilistic safety
nology (2018), https://doi.orhave been attacks that could have severe consequences. A practical
example is “Stuxnet”, which was a malware released in 2010 in the
Iranian nuclear facility to destroy the components physically. In
NPPs, digital I&C systems have been adopted not only in safety
systems such as reactor protection systems (RPS), engineered safety
features actuation systems (ESFAS), safety instrumentation sys-
tems, and safety monitoring systems, but also in non-safety sys-
tems such as instrumentation control systems, information
processing and monitoring systems, and non-safety monitoring
systems [4]. There have been many reports on I&C system vulner-
abilities and various attack paths [5], and it means that they might
be targets of cyber-attacks.
To protect NPPs against cyber-attacks, in 2009 and 2010, 10 CFR
73.54 “Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems
and Networks” [6] and RG 5.71 “Cyber Security Programs for Nu-
clear Facilities” [7] were published by the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. They deﬁned CDAs which are deﬁned as digital assets
that are safety-critical assets to be protected in any situations, and it
is required NPP licensees to submit a cyber-security plan for pro-
tecting CDAs. Accordingly, studies on CDA identiﬁcation or cyber-
attack detection on NPPs have been performed in recent years.
However, it is difﬁcult to protect all CDAs because that CDAs in anopen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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it is not easy to develop a perfect cyber security system against
cyber-attacks. In general, a new cyber-attack monitoring or pro-
tection system is programmed to detect previously known types of
cyber-attacks. When a new cyber-attack is observed, the cyber se-
curity system is updated using the information of the new attack.
That means new types of cyber-attacks are difﬁcult to be detected
and protected. However, this imperfect defense is impermissible for
safety critical systems such as NPPs which could be cause serious
consequences. If only known attacks are defendable, in case of a
new type of cyber-attack with newmalicious software, the security
system is not useful. In addition, malicious software or viruses can
be latent; it can lead to the loss of safety functions in the event of an
accident. Therefore, importance analysis of cyber-attacks should be
performed on feasible cyber-attack scenarios to develop efﬁcient
defense strategies using risk information. However, the studies to
analyze importance of cyber-attacks or develop risk-informed se-
curity strategies are not yet mature.
In this work, a framework for identifying signiﬁcant CDAs and
analyzing importance scenarios of cyber-attacks on an NPP was
proposed based on probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) approach.
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed framework, case
studies were performed by developing PSAmodels of cyber-attacks
on an NPP and quantitatively evaluating the effect of the attacks.
The risk information obtained from the proposed method could be
used to identify important CDAs. Consequently, more efﬁcient risk-
informed cyber security strategies and development of regulation
PSA models for cyber-security could be possible.2. PSA-based quantitative importance analysis method for
cyber-attacks
2.1. Probabilistic risk assessment for cyber-attacks
There are various methods for evaluating the risk or reliability of
general energy systems such as solar power systems, smart grids
systems, and NPPs [8,9]. One of the widely used methods to eval-
uate the risk of an NPP is PSA. In this study, we utilize PSAmodels to
evaluate the importance of a cyber-attack.
Typically, the risk of an NPP is represented as the product of
frequency and consequence of event [10]. The core damage fre-
quency (CDF) is estimated from level 1 PSA by constructing event
trees (ETs) and fault trees (FTs) [11,12]. The ETs illustrate accident
sequences from deﬁned initiating events, and the FTs quantitatively
evaluate the system failure probabilities [13]. The consequence
such as fatalities and properties loss is estimated from level 3 PSA.
In the same sense, the risk of a cyber-attack can be represented as
the product of the frequencies of cyber-attacks and their conse-
quences. However, since a cyber-attack is conducted intentionally,
it is not possible to estimate or predict its frequency. Therefore, this
work focused on the consequence analysis for given cyber-attacks.
For the consequence of a cyber-attack, the risk change of an NPP
such as the change of CDF and conditional core damage probability
(CCDP) were used.
The risk induced by a cyber-attack can be represented by the
product of cyber-attack frequency, the conditional probability of
events for the cyber-attack, and the consequence of the events as
represented in Eq. (1):
Risk of cyber  attack ¼ Fðcyber  attackÞ  PðEventjcyber
 attackÞ  CðEventÞ
(1)
As mentioned above, since a cyber-attack frequency is notPlease cite this article in press as: J.W. Park, S.J. Lee, Probabilistic safety
power plants, Nuclear Engineering and Technology (2018), https://doi.orquantiﬁable, this work is focused on the importance analysis
including triggered events by a given cyber-attack and the conse-
quence of the events.
2.2. Identiﬁcation of possible cyber-attacks
NPPs have adopted digital I&C systems such as programmable
logic controllers (PLCs). They can be attacked using malicious
software through various attack paths such as networks and
external devices [5], although NPPs are designed with external and
internal networks separately. To develop a PSA model for cyber-
attacks, the possible types of cyber-attacks should be identiﬁed.
In this research, the attacks are categorized into four types as
follows:
C Type 1. Direct attacks: Attacks on digital systems to render
them unavailable or to cause abnormal behavior (e.g., attacks
on a digital output module in RPS)
C Type 2. Indirect attacks: Attacks on control logics for non-
digitalized components such as pumps and valves (e.g., at-
tacks on a PLC which control to analog components)
C Type 3. Operator failures: Attacks on information systems to
block the information or to switch it with wrong information
(e.g., attacks on a monitoring system)
C Type 4. Initiating events: Attacks causing initiating events
(e.g., LOCA by opening PORV of PZR)
The ﬁrst type of cyber-attack is direct attacks. In an NPP, there
are digitalized systems such as RPS and ESFAS. If hackers attack the
digital systems such as input and output modules, the systems can
be rendered unavailable or abnormal. For instance, the RPS has
multiple digital/analog input modules, processor module, and
output modules to decide trip condition and to generate a trip
signal for mitigating accidents [14]. If the RPS is failed by cyber-
attack (e.g., output modules CCF by a cyber attack), the risk to the
NPP will increase consequently.
The second type of cyber-attack is indirect attacks. In a digitalized
NPP, some analog components such as pumps and valves are
controlled by digital controllers such as PLCs. Although a component
is made only of analog parts, if it is controlled by a digital control
system, it could be failed to perform a requested function or be
physically damaged by a cyber-attack. In an Idaho National Labora-
tory experiment, it was shown that an emergency diesel generator
which is one of the analog components, could be physically damaged
by cyber-attacks on PLCs which control the diesel generator [15].
The third type of cyber-attack is operator failures. As observed in
the Three Miles Island-2 accident, wrong information could cause
inadequate operations by human operators. In the accident, the
coolant of the primary side was continuously leaked through the
failed safety depressurization valve, and the safety injection system
was automatically started to operate. However, the operators did not
recognize the correct state of the safetydepressurizationvalve due to
the failed indicator, so that they turnedoff the safety injection system
which should have been kept working. This type of error of com-
mission (EOC) could occur due to cyber-attacks by compromising
human-machine interface systems. Providing thewrong information
might have severe effects on the plant safety in certain situations.
The last type of cyber-attack indicates the cyber-attacks causing
initiating events such as loss of coolant accident (LOCA), interfacing
systems LOCA (IS-LOCA), and station black out (SBO). This type of
cyber-attackmay be happened by complex (both direct and indirect
cyber-attacks) cyber-attacks. For instance, if PLCs on the letdown
valves or safety depressurization valves were cyber-attacked to
stuck open, it could lead to coolant loss, causing an intentional
LOCA. Similarly, if cyber-attack occurs in PLCs on isolation valves,assessment-based importance analysis of cyber-attacks on nuclear
g/10.1016/j.net.2018.09.009
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analyze possible incidents caused by cyber-attacks, because addi-
tional initiating events which are not included the current PSA
models should be considered.
2.3. Analysis of basic event
2.3.1. Basic events categorization
A cyber-attack on an NPP can be modeled as a basic event or an
initiating event according to its type in the PSA model. The target
plant of the PSA model used in this work has digitalized RPS,
diverse protection system (DPS) and ESFAS. Also, other analog
components such as pumps and valves are controlled by digital
controllers, PLCs. The events in a PSA model were categorized ac-
cording to the four types of cyber-attacks. If an event has no relation
with any cyber-attack type, then it is screened out. Fig. 1 shows the
example of categorization of basic events. After categorization,
additional events were added to represent the component failure
by cyber-attacks. For example, in case of the digital output module
failure in the RPS shown in Fig. 1, a new node for representing the
output module failure by a cyber-attack is added.
2.3.2. RAW analysis
Since a cyber-attack is an intended attack and any components
digitalized or connected to digital systems could be the target of
cyber-attacks, it is not possible to consider all possible attack sce-
narios. Moreover, there are numerous CDAs in an NPP. Therefore,
important components, which have relatively large effect on the
plant safety when attacked, need to be identiﬁed. In this work, to
observe the severity of an attack, risk achievement worth (RAW)
was used. RAW is one of the important measures to observe the
change in the total system failure probability when a certain
component is assumed to fail [16]. Through the RAW analysis, only
basic events that affect the risk of NPP signiﬁcantly are focused in
the analysis. The cut-off value was adjusted from 1E-10 to 1E-15 in
the RAW analysis in order to reconsider screened-out basic events
due to low failure probabilities.
2.4. Development of a cyber-attack PSA model
2.4.1. Failure mode analysis
To develop a cyber-attack risk evaluation model, the failureType 1. Direct attacks
DIGITAL OUTPUT
MODULE FAIL TO
GENERATE TRIP SIGNAL
RPSDO_FAIL
Type 3. Operator failure
OPERATOR FAILS TO
OPERATE TRIP
MANUALLY
RPSOP_FAIL
Fig. 1. Example of the categorization of basic e
Please cite this article in press as: J.W. Park, S.J. Lee, Probabilistic safety
power plants, Nuclear Engineering and Technology (2018), https://doi.ormodes of systems due to cyber-attacks need to be identiﬁed. While
various failure modes could occur by attack types and paths, it is
conservatively assumed that attacked systems are failed and
operator with wrong information fail to perform appropriate ac-
tions. Table 1 to Table 3 show the example of failure mode analysis
mainly focused on their function failures.
Table 1 lists the failure modes of RPS caused by cyber-attacks.
RPS has only one failure mode, which is the reactor trip failure
[17]. Table 2 and Table 3 list the failure modes of ESFAS caused by
cyber-attacks. ESFAS was analyzed based on it actuation signals
such as safety injection actuation signal (SIAS), auxiliary feed water
actuation signal (AFAS), recirculating actuation signal (RAS),
containment spray actuation signal (CSAS), containment isolation
actuation signal (CIAS), and main steam isolation actuation signal
(MSIS). Further, human actuation failures in both error of omission
(EOO) and EOC were considered in this analysis. As shown in
Table 2, SIAS, AFAS, RAS, and CSAS have a similar trend in failure
modes. However, as given in Table 3, CIAS and MSIS have possible
consequences of both core damage and release of radioactive
sources.
2.4.2. FT development
To develop a cyber-attack PSAmodel, the FTs were developed to
consider the effect of a cyber-attack. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show the
example parts of the reactor trip and safety injection in the
developed FT model. The basic PSA model is the optimized pres-
surized reactor-1000 (OPR-1000) PSA model and PLCs for compo-
nent controls are considered. As mentioned above, the plant used
for the model development has digitalized RPS, DPS, and ESFAS,
and other analog components or systems are controlled by digital
controllers, PLCs. New basic events which marked with color were
modeled in Figs. 2 and 3 based on the identiﬁcation of four possible
cyber-attack types as follows:
C Type 1 (Direct Attack): For digital systems, additional failure
with yellow marked basic events were added as shown in
Fig. 2. Likewise, as shown in Fig. 3, additional failure in ESFAS
with yellow marked basic event was included.
C Type 2 (Indirect Attack): As shown in Fig. 3, PLCs failure due
to cyber-attack with blue marked basic event was considered
in the developed model. This newly considered basic event
indirectly effected to analog components.Type 2. Indirect attacks
FAILURE OF PLC FOR
COMPONENT
CONTROL
CCPLC_FAIL
Type 4. Initiating events
SMALL LOCA
INITIATING EVENT
%IE-SLOCA
vents according by types of cyber-attack.
assessment-based importance analysis of cyber-attacks on nuclear
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Table 1
Failure modes of the RPS under cyber-attacks.
System Signal of Function Plant State Failure Mode 1
(Direct Attack)
Failure Mode 2
(Attacks causing operator failure)
Result
RPS Trip signal Need to trip OK OK Trip Success
Need to trip Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup
failed by cyber-attack
ATWSa
a ATWS is anticipated transient without scram, which is the initiating event.
Table 2
Failure modes of the ESFAS under cyber-attacks (1/2).
System Signal of Function Plant State Failure Mode 1
(Direct or Indirect Attacks)
Failure Mode 2
(Attacks causing operator failure)
Result
ESFAS SIAS Need to SIAS OK OK OK
Need to SIAS OK EOC induced by cyber-attack Lead to SIAS failure
Need to SIAS Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup OK
Need to SIAS Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup
failed by cyber-attack
Lead to SIAS failure
AFAS Need to AFAS OK OK OK
Need to AFAS OK EOC induced by cyber-attack Lead to AFAS failure
Need to AFAS Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup OK
Need to AFAS Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup
failed by cyber-attack
Lead to AFAS failure
RAS Need to RAS OK OK OK
Need to RAS OK EOC induced by cyber-attack Lead to RAS failure
Need to RAS Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup OK
Need to RAS Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup
failed by cyber-attack
Lead to RAS failure
CSAS Need to CSAS OK OK OK
Need to CSAS OK EOC induced by cyber-attack Lead to CSAS failure
Need to CSAS Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup OK
Need to CSAS Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup
failed by cyber-attack
Lead to CSAS failure
Table 3
Failure modes of the ESFAS under cyber-attacks (2/2).
System Signal of
Function
Plant State Failure Mode 1
(Direct or Indirect
Attacks)
Failure Mode 2
(Attacks causing operator failure)
Result
ESFAS CIAS Need to CIAS OK OK OK
Need to CIAS OK EOC induced by cyber-attack Lead to CIAS failure
Need to CIAS Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
OK
(Operator success to backup)
OK
Need to CIAS Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup failed by cyber-
attack
Lead to CIAS failureþ possible to release radiological material
MSIS Need to
MSIS
OK OK OK
Need to
MSIS
OK EOC induced by cyber-attack Lead to MSIS failure
Need to
MSIS
Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
OK
(Operator success to backup)
OK
Need to
MSIS
Digital modules
failed by cyber-attack
Operation backup
failed by cyber-attack
Lead to MSIS failure þ possible to release radiological
material
J.W. Park, S.J. Lee / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (2018) 1e84C Type 3 (Attacks causing operator failure): Both operator er-
rors EOO and EOC caused by cyber-attacks weremodeled. For
instance, manual SIAS generation failure by plant informa-
tion block is an example of EOO, and inappropriate termi-
nation of operating safety injection (SI) by an operator due to
wrong information is an example of EOC. They modeled as
green and red marked basic events as shown in Fig. 3. For
reactor trip failure, only EOO is considered.Please cite this article in press as: J.W. Park, S.J. Lee, Probabilistic safety
power plants, Nuclear Engineering and Technology (2018), https://doi.orC Type 4 (Attacks causing initiating events): This attack is
represented by setting a corresponding initiating event as
happened. New IE caused by cyber-attack which is not
included in the current PSA model is not considered in this
work.2.5. Metrics of importance
In general, CDF is used as a risk metric for level 1 PSA. Since theassessment-based importance analysis of cyber-attacks on nuclear
g/10.1016/j.net.2018.09.009
REACTOR TRIP
FAILURE
RT-FAIL
RPS FAILS TO TRIP
ON SCRAM DEMAND
RPS-FAIL
DPS FAILS TO TRIP
ON SCRAM DEMAND
DPS-FAIL
RPS FAILURE DUE TO
MECH. OR
CYBER-ATTACK
RPS-SIGNAL
OPERATOR FAILS TO
GENERATE RX
SIGNAL
RPS-OPERATOR
DPS FAILURE DUE TO
MECH. OR
CYBER-ATTACK
DPS-SIGNAL
OPERATOR FAILS TO
GENERATE RX
SIGNAL
DPS-OPERATOR
RPS FAILS TO TRIP
ON SCRAM DEMAND
RPS-FAIL
RPS FAILURE DUE TO
CYBER-ATTACK
RPS-CYBER
OPERATOR FAILS TO
GENERATE RX
SIGNAL USING RPS
RPS-MANUAL
OPERATOR FAILS TO
GENERATE DUE TO
CYBER-ATTACK
RPS-OP-CYBER
DPS FAILS TO TRIP
ON SCRAM DEMAND
DPS-FAIL
DPS FAILURE DUE TO
CYBER-ATTACK
DPS-CYBER
OPERATOR FAILS TO
GENERATE RX
SIGNAL USING DPS
DPS-MANUAL
OPERATOR FAILS TO
GENERATE DUE TO
CYBER-ATTACK
DPS-OP-CYBER
Fig. 2. Reactor trip FT model including cyber-attacks.
SAFETY INJECTION
FAILURE
SI-FAIL
FAIL TO CONTROL
COMPONENT
CONTROL-FAIL
FAIL TO MAKE FLOW
DUE TO MECHANICAL
FAILURE OF
COMPONENT
MECH-FAIL
OPERATOR
INAPPROPRIATELY
TERMINATE SI DUE TO
CYBER-ATTACK (EOC)
SIAS-OP-EOC
FAIL TO GENERATE SI
SIGNAL
SIAS-FAIL
FAILURE OF PLC FOR
CONTROL
COMPONENT
PLC-FAIL
LOSS OF ELECTRIC
POWER SYSTEM
EPS-FAIL
SIAS FAILS DUE TO
MECH. OR
CYBER-ATTACK
SIAS-SIGNAL
OPERATOR FAILS
MANUALLY TO
GENERATE SIAS
SIAS-OPERATOR
FAILURE OF LOOP
CONTROLLER
PLC-CONTROL
PLC FAILS TO
CONTROL COMPONENT
DUE TO CYBER-ATTACK
PLC-CYBER
FAIL TO GENERATE SI
SIGNAL
SIAS-FAIL
FAIL TO GENERATE SI
SIGNAL DUE TO
CYBER-ATTACK
ESFAS-CYBER
OPERATOR FAILS
MANUALLY TO
GENERATE SIAS
SIAS-MANUAL
OPERATOR FAILS
MANUALLY TO
GENERATE SIAS DUE TO
CYBER-ATTACK (EOO)
SIAS-OP-EOO
Fig. 3. Safety injection FT model including cyber-attacks.
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metrics need to be proposed. In this work, the change in CDF and
CCDP are used as importance metrics.
- Without an initiating event, the change in CDF is used. Since
there is no initiating event occurred, the cyber-attack is not leadPlease cite this article in press as: J.W. Park, S.J. Lee, Probabilistic safety
power plants, Nuclear Engineering and Technology (2018), https://doi.orto core damage. Therefore, in this case, the increase of potential
risk of a plant by a cyber-attack is used as the risk measure.
- With an initiating event, CCDP is used. When an initiating event
occurred by a type four cyber-attack, the plant risk can be rep-
resented as CCDP. This measure means the probability that the
given initiating event by an attack leads to core damage. In this
case, multiple attacks (e.g., one attack to cause LOCA and theassessment-based importance analysis of cyber-attacks on nuclear
g/10.1016/j.net.2018.09.009
Table 4
Case study results of cyber-attacks in the RPS scenario.
Risk metric Scenario 1-1 Scenario 1-2
CDFa changes Increases 40.9 times Increases 125 times
Risk metric Scenario 1e3 Scenario 1e4
CCDPb with SLOCA 1.23% 1.41%
a CDF is core damage frequency.
b CCDP is conditional core damage probability.
Table 5
Case study results of cyber-attacks in the ESFAS scenario.
Risk metric Scenario 2-1 Scenario 2-2
CDFa changes Increases 5.32 times Increases 1502 times
Risk metric Scenario 2-3 Scenario 2-4 Scenario 2-5
CCDPb with SLOCA Less than 1% Less than 1% 16.5%
a CDF is core damage frequency.
b CCDP is conditional core damage probability.
J.W. Park, S.J. Lee / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (2018) 1e86other simultaneous attacks on RPS and ESFAS) make the CCDP
higher.
3. Case study
3.1. Development of scenario for importance analysis
For a feasibility study, case studies were performed. In the case
studies, quantitative evaluations for several cyber-attack scenarios
were performed through the proposed importance evaluation
method. To perform quantitative evaluation, scenario development
should be conducted. Although it is the most reasonable way to
develop scenarios based on real examples of cyber-attacks on NPPs
or test-beds, such data is not enough to develop scenarios [18].
Therefore, we selected several example scenarios for the feasibility
study, mainly focused on the digitalized systems such as RPS, DPS
and ESFAS by considering four types of cyber-attacks described in
section 2.2. To apply this method to an NPP and to identify
important CDAs, it is necessary to consider all possible scenarios
not only considered events in the current PSA models but also
unconsidered events caused by only cyber-attacks.
In a research for qualitative analysis of CDAs for cyber-attacks,
CDAs are classiﬁed with cyber security levels for a graded
approach [4]. For instance, critical systems such as RPS and ESFAS
are classiﬁed as security level 3, a large display panel and infor-
mation processing systems classiﬁed as security level 2, support
systems are classiﬁed as security level 1 in order [4]. In scenario
development, the security levels of CDA and types of cyber-attacks
proposed in this work were considered.
For preliminary quantitative risk evaluations, two represented
scenarios were developed. The target systems were RPS and ESFAS.
Scenario 1 represents cyber-attacks on RPS, while scenario 2 rep-
resents cyber-attacks on ESFAS. Scenario 1 and 2 includes four and
ﬁve sub-scenarios each. Scenario 1 with four sub-scenarios was
constructed as follows:
C Scenario 1-1: Digital output modules common cause failure
(CCF) in RPS under a cyber-attack
C Scenario 1-2: RPS signal generation and manual backup
failure under a cyber-attack
C Scenario 1-3: RPS trip signal generation failure with a small
loss of coolant accident (SLOCA) by cyber-attacks
C Scenario 1-4: Scenario 1-3 þ operator manual backup failure
due to cyber-attacks on information processing system
Scenario 2 with ﬁve sub-scenarios was constructed as follows:
C Scenario 2-1: Actuation signal generation failure by digital
output modules CCF in ESFAS under a cyber-attack
C Scenario 2-2: ESFAS actuation signal generation failure and
manual backup failure (EOO) for HPSI actuation under a
cyber-attack
C Scenario 2-3: Scenario 2-1 þ SLOCA by a cyber-attack
C Scenario 2-4: Operator manual backup failure (EOO) under
SLOCA situation
C Scenario 2-5: Intentional termination of HPSI in all trains by
operators (EOC) under SLOCA situation
Both scenarios 1 and 2 are considering the cases with and
without an initiating event. Scenarios 1-1 and 2-1 indicate digital
output module CCF in RPS or ESFAS due to cyber-attack. It is
assumed that RPS and ESFAS have 4 redundant trains and one
identical software in all trains. Therefore, there is a possibility of
CCF due to cyber-attacks on the identical software. Scenarios 1-2
and 2-2 consider operator manual backup failure with the event ofPlease cite this article in press as: J.W. Park, S.J. Lee, Probabilistic safety
power plants, Nuclear Engineering and Technology (2018), https://doi.orscenario 1-1 and 1-2 respectively. The above scenarios are quanti-
tatively evaluated with change of CDF which is one of the impor-
tance metrics. Scenarios 1-3 to 1-4 and 2-3 to 2-5 consider an
initiating event caused by a cyber-attack, SLOCA. These scenarios
are evaluated with CCDP. Both scenarios 1-3 and 2-3 include digital
output module CCF under cyber-attacks with SLOCA. Scenarios 1-4
and 2-4 to 5 consider operator failures due to cyber-attacks.
Especially, in scenario 2-4 and 2-5, EOO and EOC are assumed to
observe the difference of their effect. After the scenarios were
developed, related basic events were updated in the FT models to
evaluate the importance.3.2. Result analysis of importance evaluation
Table 4 and Table 5 show the evaluation results. Since the events
of system or operator failures without initiating events in scenarios
1-1 to 1-2 and 2-1 to 2-2, the risks are represented as the change of
CDF. As expected, the CCF of the RPS digital output modules due to
cyber-attack greatly affected to the change of CDF. It increased
about 40 times. In the preceding situation, if the operator cannot
operate manual backup due to compromised information by a
cyber-attack, the change of CDF dramatically increased about 125
times. Also, in scenario 2-1, actuation signal generation for all
engineered safety features is failed by a cyber-attack, in result, the
CDF increase about 5 times. And operators cannot operate the HPSI
manually due to wrong information, the CDF increases more than
RPS cases because basic error probability of operator’s manual
backup for ESFAS is much lower than that of RPS.
This evaluation result means that it is highly important to pre-
vent the simultaneous failures of RPS or ESFAS and operatormanual
backup. One of the possible cyber security strategies to prevent
these simultaneous events is to provide analog information sys-
tems for important plant parameters to operators for diversity.
In scenarios 1-3 to 1-4 and 2-3 to 2-5, the risks are represented
by CCDP because an initiating event by a cyber-attack is considered.
In the case of the RPS scenario, it was analyzed to have a CCDP value
of about 1~2% as shown in Table 4. In this case, because the DPS is
available, the CCDP and the effect of manual backup failure of the
operator due to the cyber-attack is relatively low. In the case of
ESFAS, the scenario of CCF of digital output modules in ESFAS due to
cyber-attack showed similar result to RPS case as shown in Table 5.
Scenario 2-4 and 2-5, which considered EOO and EOC respectively
showed very distinct differences in CCDP. In the scenario for EOOassessment-based importance analysis of cyber-attacks on nuclear
g/10.1016/j.net.2018.09.009
Table 6
Case study results of CCF case for several CDAs due to cyber-attacks.
Effect of Cyber-Attacks System CDA Detailed description of failure modes Changes of CDF
Common Cause Failure RPS All bistable processor (BP) modules CCF of all BP modules in RPS 1243%
All coincidence processor (CP) modules CCF of all CP processing modules in RPS 248%
All watchdog timers (WDTs) CCF of all WDTs in RPS No effect
DPS All DPS processor modules CCF of all processor modules in DPS 132%
ESFAS All coincidence logic (CL) modules CCF of all CL modules in ESFAS 557%
All digital input (DI) modules CCF of all DI modules in ESFAS 416%
Table 7
Case study results of single failure case for several CDAs due to cyber-attacks.
Effect of Cyber-
Attacks
System CDA Detailed description of failure modes Changes of
CDF
Single Failure
RPS Single BP module One BP module fails to generate trip signal No effect
Single CP WDT The WDT in one CP processor module fails to detect a fault No effect
DPS Single DPS processor module One DPS processor module fails to generate trip signal 132%
ESFAS
Single CL module for pump
controller
One CL module for one pump group controller fails to provide output 19%
Single CL module for valve
controller
One CL module for one valve group controller fails to provide output 19%
Single DI module for pump
controller
One DI module for one pump group controller in one ESFAS channel fails to provide
output
No effect
Single DI module for valve
controller
One DI module for one valve group controller in one ESFAS channel fails to provide
output
No effect
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EOC showed an extremely high CCDP value of 16.5%. While EOO
was analyzed to have no signiﬁcant impact because ESFAS was
assumed to work normally, EOC was found to have a signiﬁcant
impact because it caused the termination of HPSI pumps auto-
matically actuated. This situation is a similar situation with the
TMI-2 accident. Therefore, cyber security strategies should be
proposed to prevent EOC due to cyber-attack.
Based on the cyber-attack risk model, the importance of each
system can be obtained as the change of CDF. Tables 6 and 7 shows
an example of importance analysis of CDAs in RPS, DPS, and ESFAS.
As shown in Tables 6 and 7, CCFs caused by cyber-attacks have high
effects on the plant safety in almost all cases. While the compo-
nents which have direct relation with system functions such as
output modules have great effects, components for system moni-
toring such as watchdog timer have low effects.
Tables 6 and 7 show an example of CDA importance analysis
results for digitalized components. As shown in the tables, single
component failure in RPS and ESFAS have low effect to the changes
of CDF compared to CCFs because RPS and ESFAS are designed with
redundancy concept: four redundant channels for 2-out-of-4
voting logic and two processor modules for each channel. However,
in case of DPS, DPS has only two channels with 2-out-of-2 voting
logic. If one signal processor in the two DPS channels is failed by
cyber-attack, the effect of single component failure due to cyber-
attack is same as CCF case.4. Discussions
The study proposed a framework for importance analysis of
cyber-attacks on an NPP based on PSA models to provide risk in-
formation for efﬁcient cyber security strategy development. Fol-
lowings are remained research items which should be conducted
for more reliable evaluations.
- Failure modes: At this stage, the result of all cyber-attacks was
assumed to cause failure of digital components or systems only.
However, it is a conservative assumption because some cyber-
attacks could cause failure modes which has relatively lowPlease cite this article in press as: J.W. Park, S.J. Lee, Probabilistic safety
power plants, Nuclear Engineering and Technology (2018), https://doi.oreffects than entire failure of a system. Therefore, it is necessary
to consider possible failure modes according to types of cyber-
attacks.
- Identiﬁcation of initiating events caused by cyber-attacks: The
current PRA models consider the initiating events caused by
random hardware failure and external events. However, more
various initiating events should be considered against cyber-
attack because unconsidered or unexpected initiating events
can occur according to the knowledge of attackers. Therefore, it
is necessary to analyze the possibility of initiating events by
cyber-attacks which are not considered in the current PSA
models.
- Frequency and complexity: This work is focused on the conse-
quence analysis for the given attacks because it is difﬁcult to
estimate the frequency of an intended attack. The frequency
concept is not appropriate for an intended attack. Therefore, we
are considering to use the complexity or difﬁculty of a cyber-
attack instead of the frequency to evaluate the risk. In future
work, the complexity or difﬁculty of a cyber-attack will be
assessed by considering various characteristics of cyber-attacks.5. Conclusion
The cyber security for safety-critical infrastructures such as an
NPP has introduced as one of the emerging issues as digital tech-
nology has been widely applied. In fact, for the last decades, a
number of cyber-attacks on safety-critical infrastructures have
been reported. Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facility showed
that it is possible to attack an NPP although it has physically
separated internal/external network. However, developing an efﬁ-
cient and perfect cyber security strategy is a challenging issue
because of the huge number of CDAs and unpredictable attack
paths or methods in large and complex systems. Thus, it could be
one of the efﬁcient approaches to develop the strategy based on the
risk information of cyber-attacks. In this study, the framework for
PSA-based importance analysis of cyber-attacks and CDAs was
proposed. In the case studies, the risks of two cyber-attack sce-
narios were quantitively evaluated with two risk metrics; CDF andassessment-based importance analysis of cyber-attacks on nuclear
g/10.1016/j.net.2018.09.009
J.W. Park, S.J. Lee / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (2018) 1e88CCDP. Also, the importance of a component or a system was
quantitively analyzed. It is expected to use the proposedmethod for
developing an efﬁcient cyber security strategy by identifying
important CDAs and attack scenarios.
Acknowledgment
This work has supported by the National Research Foundation of
Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No.
2018M2B2B1065653).
References
[1] J. Song, J. Lee, C. Lee, K. Kwon, D. Lee, A cyber security risk assessment for the
design of I & C systems in nuclear power plants 44 (8) (2012) 919e928.
[2] U.S. ICS-CERT, Year in Review 2016, 2016.
[3] A. Nicholson, et al., SCADA security in the light of Cyber-Warfare, Comput.
Secur. 31 (2012) 418e436.
[4] J. Park, J. Park, Y. Kim, A graded approach to cyber security in a research
reactor facility, Prog. Nucl. Energy 65 (2013) 81e87.
[5] J.G. Song, J.W. Lee, G.Y. Park, K.C. Kwon, D.Y. Lee, C.K. Lee, An analysis of
technical security control requirements for digital I&C systems in nuclear
power plants, Nucl. Eng. Technol. 45 (5) (2013) 637e652.
[6] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Protection of Digital Computer andPlease cite this article in press as: J.W. Park, S.J. Lee, Probabilistic safety
power plants, Nuclear Engineering and Technology (2018), https://doi.orCommunication Systems and Networks, 2009, 10 CFR Part 73.54.
[7] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Cyber security Programs for nuclear
facilities, Regulatory Guide 5 (71) (2010).
[8] Lan Wu, et al., Reliability evaluation of the solar power system based on the
Markov chain method, Int. J. Energy Res. (2017) 1e8, 2017.
[9] J.B. Ko, et al., Towards a novel quantiﬁcation approach based on smart grid
network vulnerability score, Int. J. Energy Res. 40 (2016) 298e312, 2016.
[10] Y. Cherdantseva, et al., A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for
SCADA systems, Comput. Secur. 56 (2015) 1e27.
[11] Ernest J. Henley, Hiromitsu Kumamoto, Probabilistic Risk Assessment: Reli-
ability Engineering, Design, and Analysis, IEEE Press, New York, 1992.
[12] P.A.S. Ralston, J.H. Graham, J.L. Hieb, Cyber security risk assessment for SCADA
and DCS networks, ISA Trans. 46 (4) (2007) 583e594.
[13] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Fault Tree Handbook, NUREG-0492,
1981.
[14] D. Lee, J. Choi, J. Lyou, A safety assessment methodology for a digital reactor
protection system, Int. J. Contr. Autom. Syst. 4 (1) (2006) 105e112.
[15] Idaho National Laboratory, Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of the U.S.
Electric Sector, 2016.
[16] M. Van Der Borst, H. Schoonakker, An overview of PSA importance measures,
Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 72 (3) (2001) 241e245.
[17] J. Park, Y. Suh, C. Park, Implementation of cyber security for safety systems of
nuclear facilities, Prog. Nucl. Energy 88 (2016) 88e94.
[18] P.A.S. Ralstona, J.H. Grahamb, J.L. Hiebb, Cyber security risk assessment for
SCADA and DCS networks, ISA (Instrum. Soc. Am.) Trans. 46 (4) (2007)
583e594.assessment-based importance analysis of cyber-attacks on nuclear
g/10.1016/j.net.2018.09.009
